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INTRODUCTION 
During the last 12 years the United States and the Soviet Union have 
been engaged in cold war. Cold war is the term adopted shortly after World 
War 11 to describe the intense hostile rivalry which burst into life between 
the United States and the Soviet Union immediately after they had gained 
military victory over Germany and Japan. Each blames the other for 
starting the cold war. Each blames the other for continuing it. Each has 
sought to win the advantage over the other in it. Meanwhile the cold war 
goes on, with each side offering to call a halt only on terms which it 
knows the other will not accept. 
It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to determine which side bears 
the major responsibility for starting the cold war, nor even for continuing 
it. Each side has its "war partyr1 and each side its llpeace party. l t  To 
assess credit or blame accurately is difficult, for we are  all involved in 
the history of our times, and it is not easy to be objective and detached. 
But this does not mean that we must live in a state of suspended judg- 
ment until a reliable history of this period has been written. The crises 
of these times will not wait. It is a duty and a necessity to take stock of 
ourselves now and to see whether the course which we are  following is 
gettinguswherewewant to go. It is the purpose of this pamphlet to assess, 
the results of 12 years of cold war with the interests and the purposes, 
the principles and aspirations, of organized labor particularly in mind. 
During the last 75 years the rise of the American labor movement has 
been a momentous fact. Labor has fought for a share in the rising national 
prosperity. Labor has won the legal right to organize and to bargain col- 
lectively. Labor's days of struggle have led to periods of substantial 
growth and massive institutional development. 
Today America is a world power and must play a role of responsibility 
in world affairs. A great d&l depends upon the spirit and the character 
of that participation. As in domestic affairs, so in the foreign policies 
of our nation, the conscience and the wisest understanding of our true 
interests as a people must speak out of the mind and heart of America's 
democratic institutions, including the trade unions. 
These a re  some of the questions with which we shall deal: 
1. Has the cause of labor been strengthened by the cold war? 
2. Has the cold war strengthened our domestic economy ? 
3. Has the cold war strengthened us a s  a nation and made us more 
secure? 
4. Has the cold war aided our efforts to promote world economic 
development ? 
5. Should labor support a new foreign policy? 
These questions a r e  certain to excite controversy and debate. But that 
is all the more reason why the issues must be discussed. Our world is 
too volatile and the price of error is too high to take anything for granted. 
Noble intentions a re  not a safeguard. It is theresults that count, and after 
1 12 years of cold war it is time for us to take stock. 
THE COLD WAR AND THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY 
Has the cold war strengthened our domestic economy? Has the well- 
being of labor been advanced here at  home? 
During the New Deal days of the 193OTs, the role of the government in 
industrial relations was radically altered, and the right of the working 
people to join, form, and assist unions, and to bargain collectively through 
agents of their own choosing was established in law. Industry could no 
longer use industrial spies nor engage in acts of intimidatibn and discrim- 
ination against union members. New legislation and new administrative 
agencies assured workers of legal protection against unfair labor prac- 
tices. The rule of the ballot box began to supplant the rule of tooth and 
claw in industrial life. Working people were granted the right of group 
representation which other elements in society had long enjoyed. 
The forward motion of the New Deal was brought to a sharp halt when 
World War II swept over the United States at Pearl Harbor. As President 
Roosevelt put it, Dr. New Deal stepped aside in favor of Dr. Win-the- 
War. Tax concessions and profit guarantees were granted to industry in 
order to assure armaments production. Government boards took control 
of the market place and the bargaining table in setting prices, wages, and 
the other conditions of economic life. Under the pressure of winning the 
war labor was accorded the form, and at times the fact, of unprecedented 
opportunity and power. Union leaders headed important government 
bureaus, plants which had resisted unionism for years signed contracts, 
employers accepted labor participation in productivity and manpower 
decisions which had long been the exclusive prerogatives of management. 
Many labor leaders thought that with the end of the war a return to Dr. 
New Deal would occur and the gains of the war years would be carried 
over into the peacetime economy. They expected the advance of democ- 
racy in industry to take up where it had left off when war began. They 
also thought that a return to a peacetime economy would quickly follow 
Japanese surrenaer. But instead of an economy of peace we have had an 
economy of cold war. Peacetime expenditures on arms have set new 
records. Emergency war measures have become normal peacetime 
practices. For more than 12years the coldwar has been the largest single 
economic fact of our lives. We a re  spending better than 70 per cent of 
our entire national budget on arms and armies, past, present, and future. 
A tenth of all the goods and services we produce a re  goods and services 
directly involved in military preparations . A much larger percentage is 
indirectly involved. 
THE ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GARRISON STATE 
Much of the misunderstanding of the economic impact of the cold war 
period is due to the enormous changes which have taken place inweaponry 
and in the roles of the United States and the Soviet Union in world affairs. 
Many Americans still think of the post- World War I1 period in post- World 
War I terms. An article by the management consultant, Peter F. Drucker, 
in the January-March 1959 issue of The General Electric Defense Quarterly 
seeks to correct this. He says that the following aspects of modern arma- 
ments production a re  the "new realities1' of defense organization: 
a. The specialized nature of present defense production. In World War 
I 80 per cent or more of the material equipment of armies consisted 
of standard peacetime goods produced in ordinary peacetime fac- 
tories. Today, according to Drucker, 90 per cent of the material 
needs of the military consists of special-purpose equipment which 
cannot be produced except in special facilities, built for specific 
military purposes and usable for little else. 
b. New defense technology is based on the very rapid obsolescence of 
existing weapons. Today a new weapon is likely to be obsolete by the 
time it reaches the production stage. Military strength rests not on 
the capacity to produce mountains of weapons that already exist, but 
on the ability to design and plan the production of weapons which do 
not yet exist. 
c. Military production has become permanent rather than temporary, 
and normal rather than emergency. The present military structure 
requires permanent diversion in peacetime of a large share of the 
countryf s productive resources to military production. 
NEW ECONOMIC REALITIES CONFRONTING LABOR 
These "new realitiesT1 play a large and significant role in the economy 
a s  a whole. 
Industry is relying more heavily on government military business than 
it  ever has before in the time of peace. The sheer volume of military 
business is staggering. Since the end of World War 11, U. S. military 
expenditures have exceeded $450 billion. At the present time these ex- 
penditures a r e  over $45 billion each year. According to former Secretary 
for Air, Thomas K. Finletter, the air force has become "the world's 
biggest business." Its assets a re  larger than the combined resources of 
General Motors, A. T. & T. , ,Standard Oil of New Jersey, General Elec- 
tric, and U. S. Steel. The total value of the property of the Department of 
Defense throughout the world is estimated at approximately $150 billion. 
Never before have governmental expenditures in peacetime approached 
present outlays for arms. According to Prof. J. K. Galbraith, "Even at 
their post-war low in fiscal 1948, military outlays were greater than all 
federal spending in the pumppriming days of the New Deal. " 
In 195 1 the United Nations Economic Survey of Europe predicted that 
the defense expenditures of the Soviet Union and the United States taken 
together would soon equal or even exceed the aggregate national incomes 
of all  the underdeveloped countries of the world. In 1957 a study document 
prepared under the direction of a special committee of the U. S. Senate 
estimated that the living standards of the underdeveloped areas of Asia 
(excluding China), the Near East, and Africa could be raised three or 
four per cent each year with an outlay of $3 billion of outside capital an- 
nually. The United States is spending 15 times that amount each year on 
arms. 
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These enormous outlays represent a major source of business for key 
industries and industrial areas of the United States. In a year-end report 
on the aircraft industry, President Dewitt C. Ramsey, of the Aircraft 
Industries Association, said on December 26, 1955, that the aircraft in- 
dustry had become the nation's second largest employer with an average 
work force of 750,000. The report went on to say that between 85 and 90 
per cent of the industry's business was derived from military contracts. 
Defense business is concentrated. The big companies get the lion's 
share. A report of the Senate Armed Services Committee in October, 
1955, listed the 100 largest defense contractors for the period from July, 
1950, through the end of 1954. These 100 companies received 63.3 per 
cent of the total defense business awarded by the Defense Department, a 
total of $62,767,600,000. Heading the list was General Motors with a 
total of $6.66 billion. General Electric came fourth with $4.33 billion. 
General Dynamics had $3.5 billion, American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company had $2.25 billion, Chrysler Corporation had $2.1 billion, and 
Ford Motor Company had $2.08 billion. Of the first 17 companies on the 
list, 11 were aircraft companies with a total 'of $33.5 billion distributed 
among them. The second largest aircraft participant, United Aircraft 
Corporation, reported in March, 1958, that it finished 1957 with nearly 
$2 billion in unfilled government orders a s  compared with $2.3 billion 
for the previous year. 
These companies consume much of the country's basic metals and 
electronic equipment. They and their suppliers represent the core of U. S. 
industrial life. The vast proliferation of service and subsidiary occupations 
and activities which make up the bulk of American commercial life a r e  
directly dependent upon the economic health of these industrial giants. 
The degree to which a typical company is dependent in turn, upon military 
contracts is indicated by an article in Fortune of February, 1959, in which 
President Frank Pace of General Dynamics is quoted as saying that the 
vast industrial complex over which he presides relies on government 
military contracts for 90 per cent of its entire production. 
These giant enterprises do not fail to influence the people whom they 
employ and the communities in which their operations are located. As 
they rely on military contracts for their business and commercial life 
blood, they commit communities and entire regional areas to a dependence 
upon armaments production. Such cities as Seattle, Wash. , Wichita, Kan. , 
and Schenectady , N. Y. , and such areas as  Southern Michigan and Southern 
California would become economic disaster areas if peace suddenly "broke 
outT1 and a rapid andunplanned reduction of armaments production followed. 
In his analysis of modern weapons production, Peter Drucker warns 
against encouraging6'the growth of a substantial number of businesses which 
have no other business than defense production, " and allowinguthe develop- 
ment of 'defense production regions' in which defense business is the main- 
stay of the regional economy. " But he does 'not tell us how this is to be 
avoided (indeed, we are already in the midst of it) since he assumes that 
the dynamics of cold war will continue to operate during the next decade a8 
they have during the one just ending. 
This new dependence of the national peacetime economy upon military 
expenditures has had its effect upon the nature of the management and con- 
trol of basic industries. The changes brought about are of the greatest 
importance to the wage earners who comprise the membership of the power- 
ful trade unions in steel, aircraft, automobile, electronics, communica- 
tions, and oil. 
A most significant development, which has as yet received only slight 
attention from Congress or  the press has to do with the wide influx of high 
ranking military men into the upper echelons of the management structure 
of defense industries, Care has not been taken to camouflage efforts of 
some armaments companies to recruit retiring admirals and generals. 
North American Aviation, Inc. , for instance, a company which stood in 
sixth place on the list of 100 largest defense contractors referred to above, 
having had $3.6 billion in military orders over a three and a half year 
period, once ran an advertisement in The Wall Street Journal offerkg a 
job a s  "military advisor" to an officer "with the rank of Air  Force colo- 
nel, Navy captain, o r  higher. The ad specified that "experience on the 
joint staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is desirable. " ANorthAmericanof- 
ficial subsequentlytestified before a congressional committee that 70 high 
ranking officers replied to the ad. 
The list of former military men of high rank who since retirement 
have been employed by companies engaged in war production i s  both long 
and distinguished. Among them are: 
General Omar N. Bradley, Bulova Watch 
Lieutenant General Levin H. Campbell, International Harvester 
General Lucius D. Clay, Continental Can 
Lieutenant General Leslie Groves, Sperry Rand 
General Douglas MacArthur, Sperry Rand 
Major General Joseph T. McNarney, General Dynamics 
Lieutenant General I ra  C ., Eaker , Hughes Tool 
General Jacob L. Devers, Fairchild Engine and Airplane 
Admiral Ben Morrell, Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Major General Edward M. Power, Curtiss Wright 
General Walter Bedell Smith, American Machine and Foundry 
General B. W. Chidlaw, Thompson Products 
General Matthew B. Ridgway, Mellon Research 
Rear Admiral Lawrence B. Richardson, General Dynamics 
Rear Admiral Malcolm B. Schoeffel, General Precision Equipment 
Admiral Robert Carney, Westinghouse Electric 
Major General Harry C. Ingles, Radio Corporation of America 
Major General Frederick M. Hopkins, Cleveland Pneumatic Tool 
General A. C, Wedemeyer, Rheem Manufacturing 
Lieutenant General Clarence S. Irvine, Avco Manufacturing 
The above list includes the commanding general of the allied ground 
forces in Europe, a former chief of ordnance, aforrner military governor 
in Germany, the former head of the Manhattan Project which produced the 
first  A-bombs, the allied commander-in-chief in the Pacific theater, a 
former under-secretary of state, a former commander of U. N. forces in 
the Korean War, a former chief of naval operations, a former chief signal 
officer of the army, and a former air  force deputy chief of staff. 
At a recent hearing of the House Armed Services Subcommittee, Sen- 
ator Paul He Douglas testified that a study conducted by him revealed that 
769 retired military men with the rank of colonel or higher are  on the pay- 
rolls of 88 corporations getting militaryorders fromthe government. Ac- 
cording to Senator Douglas the companies carrying these 769 former offi- 
cers  on their payrolls get three-fourths of the government's military pro- 
curement business. Senator Douglas's list was admittedly incomplete since 
he did not succeed in getting the names of ex-officers employed by General 
Motors, Pan American Airways, and the Standard Oil Companies of New 
Jersey and of California. 
Many of the larger armaments producers employ whole batteries of 
former military men including ex-generals and ex-admirals. Lockheed 
Aircraft has 20 ex-admirals and 2 ex-generals, General Dynamics has 17 
ex-admirals and 7 ex-generals, Westinghouse Airbrake has 39 former of- 
ficers, General Electric has 35, Westinghouse Electric has 33, Boeing Air- 
craft has 30, General Tire has 28, and North American Aviation has 27. 
These officers draw their government pensions in addition to their indus- 
trial salaries. Menof five-star rank a re  kept on full military pay of about 
$20,000 per year and get their industrial salaries as well. In some in- 
stances salaries exceed $100,000 per year. 
The role of these ex-military men in the upper echelons of giant arma- 
ments companies has become a matter of public concern since very few 
military contracts are awarded on a competitive basis, and most of them 
do not specify a fixed price, but are "cost-plus. " This means that the 
pressure is off a contractor to keep costs down, for the higher the costs 
go the higher will be the yield from guaranteed ucost-plus" profit mar- 
gins. In January, 1956, Chairman Carl Vinson of the House Armed Ser- 
vices Committee disclosed that from January, 1953, to June, 1955, 94 
per cent of the $36.33 billion in defense contracts were negotiated secretly 
rather than awarded by competitive bidding. Senator Douglas stated on the 
floor of the Senate on July 1, 1957, that the percentage of negotiated con- 
tracts was 92 per cent for the period from January 1 through September 
30, 1956. More recent estimates have placed the current dollar volume of 
negotiated contracts at 86 per cent of the total defense expenditures. These 
same estimates place the cost-plus fee contracts at 94 per cent of the 
total. 
This influx of high-ranking military men into the ranks of industrial 
management at a time when vast streams of public money are being poured 
into the treasuries of the companies over which they preside ought to be 
examined. The public interest is involved, especially since the govern- 
me nt's representative s in defense contract negotiations are usually men of 
the Pentagon who will also one day retire and become available for high 
salaried jobs in private industry. Even with the most rigid standards of 
personal integrity, this situation would create conflict of interest problems. 
Brief hearings have been held by a subcommittee of the House Armed 
Services Committee inquiring into the relationships between ex-generals 
and ex-admirals of industry and the Pentagon procurement officers with 
whom their companies deal. 
Such an esteemed figure as General Omar N. Bradley, himself an in- 
dustrial board chairman with a $75,000 yearly salary from private indus- 
try, in addition to his $20,000 military pay, testified that he had never at- 
tempted to obtain a contract from the Defense Department, but he thought 
that remedial legislation probably was needed to cover cases where "a high 
sense of ethics" is not beingobserved. Vice-Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, 
the Navy's nuclear power expert, went further. He stated that he had been 
subjected to pressure by retired military officers seeking military con- 
tracts for private companies. At the insistence of the subcommittee chair- 
man, Rep. F. Edward Hebert, Rickover supplied names which were kept 
secret. He did not specify publicly the kinds of pressure applied. 
A high official of Martin Aircraft Company told the subcommittee how 
his company has flown high military officers to a country club in the Ba- 
hamas for week-end parties at  company expense. He said that these trips 
brought Martin officials into "closer relationships" with military officers, 
and he said that "all business is done on close personal contacts. " 
Actually it would be strange if under the circumstances there were 
not cases of failure, as General Bradley put it, to observe "a high sense 
of ethics. " The rewards are  astronomical and the personal risk i s  non- 
existent. At the famous court-martial of Col. John Nickerson, growing 
out of his charges that the Defense Department is riddled with lobbyists, 
he testified that "high-ranking officers of the Air Force, includinggeneral 
officers, got to thinking about retirement and a job as head of missile re- 
search with Lockheed or  some other firm.. . . Eighty-five per cent of the 
aircraft sales are  with the government. These firms put pressure on Sec- 
retary Wilson through the joint chiefs of staff, through Congress, and 
through direct contacts by representatives of ihe aircraft industry with all 
levels of the Pentagon. " 
The day after Col. Nickerson gave this sensat i~nal  testimony he was 
taken off the witness stand and the court-martial was abruptly brought to 
an end. 
A fuller and no doubt a more balanced picture of the relationship be- 
tween the Pentagon and defense contractors is supplied by the previously 
mentioned Fortune article on General Dynamics. It carried the eyebrow- 
raising title " General Dynamics vs. the USSR. " According to this article, 
General Dynamics Company, under the leadership of its president, Frank 
Pace, Jr. , has in five years seen its stock soar in value from $40 a share 
to five times a s  much, considering splits and dividends. Eighty-five per 
cent of its business is military. Its largest division is Convair which has 
produced the Atlas missile, the B-58 supersonic jet bomber, the F-106 jet 
interceptor plane, and is working now on Wizard, an anti-missile missile. 
Frank Pace, himself a Pentagon product, having been Secretary of 
the Army under President Truman, presides over an industrial empire i which has 54 retired military officers on its payroll including 17 ex-ad- mirals and 7 ex-generals. 
The interesting and revealing things is Fortune's description of the 
operational relationship between General Dynamics and the military wing 
of the government. No longer does the government go to industry and place 
orders for certain types of weapons. The whole science of weaponry to- 
day is so  technological that the military really has only a foggy idea of what 
weapons i t  may need. Left to their own resources, the generals and the 
admirals would probably continue to order more ofwhat they already have 
and hope for the best. 
General Dynamics' alternative to this horse-and-buggy approach is to 
tackle the problem of military weapons needs from the ground up. They 
start with a thorougb analysis of all technological and operational factors 
and develop entire weapons systems in a single, coordinated effort. This 
requires a small army of researchers and scientists employed by the com- 
pany. Of General Dynamics' 92,000 employees, 22,000 are  in engineer- 
ing, scientific, and technical categories. 
This weapons system approach involves three main steps: 
(1) General Dynamics decides what kind of weapons systems the govern- 
ment needs. 
(2) It educates Pentagon representatives so that they may understand what 
their future needs will be. 
(3) It accepts the Pentagon's contract to develop and produce the new 
weapons systems which their research staffs have conceptualized. 
General Dynamics' John Naish, in charge of the Convair Division, is 
quoted as saying regarding the development of the B-58 supersonic bomber, 
"First we had to dream it up, then sell it, thenoperate a Poor Man's State 
Department to get the cooperation of other contractors. " 
The weapons system approach requires basic and applied research not 
only in technology but also in the entire field of military operations. Enemy 
capabilities must be studied and analyzed, future wars must be visualized, 
and new methods must be developed to fight them. Bright young men are  
employed to make theoretical analyses of problems raised by possible wars 
of different types, from all-out holocausts to limited wars, brush-fire 
wars, and on-again off-again wars of the Quemoy type, At the same time 
the physical and psychological human capacity to stand up to the s t ress  and 
strainof supersonic speeds, and gravity-free outer space travel, is tested. 
This type of sociological and psychological research produces concepts 
about wars and weapons which determine the nature of the weapons systems 
around which American industry and American foreign policy a re  now or- 
ganized. Fairly understood, the relationship between the men of the Penta- 
gon and those ex-generals and ex-admirals who now hold positions of high 
responsibility in the munitions firms, takes on quite a different character 
from the two-dimensional picture suggested merely by listing the names 
of ex-officers working in industry, and describing profits from "cost- 
plus, " negotiated contracts , and large salaries. Those things a r e  merely 
incidentals. The fact ia that the nature of modern weapons production is 
such that even if all the ex-generals worked incognito, without pay, and 
had no contact with their former Pentagon colleagues, the Pentagon offi- 
cials responsible for armaments procurement would still be forced to re- 
ly on companies like General Dynamics, not only for their weapons, but 
also for knowledge of what kind of weapow they need, how much they will 
cost, and how long it will take to get them. The military tie binding the 
men on both sides of the table in contract negotiations sessions may wrong- 
fully influence, in some instances, the allocationof a contract o r  the amount 
the government must pay. Butthemorealarmingfactisthat the pressures 
of today's highly technological arms race have taken the initiative and the 
power to make the crucial decisions out of the hands of responsible govern- 
ment officials and placed it in the hands of technicians, planners, and sci- 
entists employed by vast industrial empires and charged with responsibility 
for their employers' interests. It is their job to dream up new weapons 
systems and persuade the military that the future of their military pro- 
fession, as well a s  the country, depends upon buyingwhat they have dreamed 
up. They prosper personally and professionally, and their employers be- 
come industrial giants only if these weapons system scientists have lively 
imaginations. Thus both the military men and their industrial counterparts 
acquire a vested interest in ever larger defense expenditures, ever more 
intricate and costly weapons systems, and ever larger weapons-producing 
industrial combines. Without continuing growth and expansion, the dynamic 
new industrial weapons companies could not develop and produce the deadly 
and ever more elaborate weapons systems which their r e  search specialists 
a re  hired to formulate. And without such formulations the high brass of 
the Pentagonwould soon lose confidence in their own profession. War to- 
day is a staggeringly futile and self-defeating busine ss. Once our weapons 
development were halted, sanity would assert  itself and pressures for a 
roll-back of armaments would become overwhelming. Only by a constant 
process of scrapping what has been produced and pressing on to produce 
something better (that is, more lethal) can the military illusion be main- 
tained among the generals and admirals (to say nothing of the population 
a s  a whole) that amilitary solution to our problems of security and sur- 
vival is still possible in this nuclear-missile age. 
For companies l ib General Dynamics, and for the generals and the 
admirals on both sides of the contract negotiations table, secrecy, inter- 
national tension, and avolatile weapons technology are  the three pillars on 
which their whole existence rests.  Solong a s  cold war fears a re  high, so 
long as official secrecy forbids full revelationof the facts surrounding the 
expenditure of vast sums on what the military and weapons manufacturers 
privately agree is worth spending money on, so long as yesterday's fail- 
ures and successes al&e can be swept into the dustbin of weapons obso- 
lescence, just so  long can our garrison state economy churn i ts  merry way. 
This cango on so long a s  the devices which the weapons manufacturers a re  
producing do not get put to actual use. When that happens it will be the end. 
The garrison state economy is a weapons centered economy. Research, 
development, and manufacture of weapons is the central dynamic that drives 
our largest industrial combines around which all the other segments of the 
economy a r e  clustered, and upon which the health and growth of the rest  
of the economy has come to depend. Weapons manufacturers do business 
in ways that have little similarity to the normal conditions of peacetime 
commerce. 
a. The bulk of their business is with a single customer possessed of 
an inexhaustible purse. 
b. There is a nearly complete identity of interest between themselves 
and agents of the customer with whom they do business; neither could 
get along without the other. 
c. They are not held to tight standards of quality and performance of prod- 
uct, but rather to alimitless capacity to think up new things to build. 
d. Though they have easier access to the public purse thanhas ever been 
known before inourhistory, they make no accounting which the pub- 
lic and its elected representatives can understand and evaluate. 
There is little wonder that the stock market takes a nose dive every time 
there is the slightest threat of disarmament and peace. Their whole multi- 
billion dollar house of cards is threatened by every peaceful breeze. 
Automation, which could be a healthy development and a great boon to 
working people, is introduced rapidly and without necessary social con- 
trols. Even if the world were at peace and the arms race had never hap- 
pened, modern technology would be producing new ways to manufacture 
more goods with less expenditure of human effort. Developments in the 
field of electronics mean that the machines of industry can now be operated, 
corrected in their performance, and supplied with the parts and materials 
they need, without large armies ofhuman machine tenders but by electronic 
controls which, under the surveillance of a few trained technicians, oper- 
ate more efficiently and at far higher speeds than the eye, mind, and hand 
of a person. The development of the vast new productive capacities which 
this makes possible has enormous potential for the well- being of mankind. 
In a stable society, organized and balanced to permit all segments of the 
society to have a fair share in the benefits of technology, automationwould 
result in shorter hours of work, higher wages, more leisure time, and a 
broad extension of opportunities for educational and cultural development 
in an atmosphere of economic security. We could be knocking on the door 
of man's ancient dream of peace and plenty. The necessary productive 
capacities are  at hand and they are  being developed rapidly. 
The realities of cold war, however, are  quite different from the possi- 
bilities of a peacetime economy. Though automation i s  being developed at 
a rapid pace, the benefits to labor are  strangely lacking. Indeed, instead 
of benefit, there is injury. Jobs in basic industry are  shrinking, even 
though production remains stable or  goes up. 
In December, 1958, automobile output was only four per cent less than 
it had been in December, 1956, but there were 20 per cent fewer auto- 
mobile workers employed. Between 1957 and 1958 telephones of the Bell 
System in the United States increased 2.5 million, and there was a 4.4 per 
cent increase in local phone calls and a 5.3 per cent rise long distance 
calls. Duringthe same period Bell System employment fell by 67,713, or 
8.5 per cent below the 1957 figure. 
During the 1958 recession steel production sagged to less than 50 per 
cent of capacity. There was widespread unemployment in the steel centers. 
Then, during the first six months of 1959, steel production rose rapidly as 
the industry and its customers stockpiled steel in anticipation of a rnid- 
year steel strike. Even so, employment in April, 1959, was 35,000 less 
than in the previous high production period of 1955, and it was even less 
than in the depression year of 1937, when steel production was less than 
half the 1959 level. During the 20 years 1939 - 1959 steel output per man- 
hour rose 87 per cent. This spectacular rise in productivity, plus an ex- 
tensive post-World War 11 development of new steel plants, has provided 
the steel industry with production capacity substantially in excess of the 
steel requirements of the economy. In early 1959 the steel industry began 
an all-out push to produce and accumulate steel stockpiles in anticipation 
of a mid-year strike. During the next six months enough steel was pro- 
duced to last the American economy for ten months of what promises to be 
a boom year. 
According to a recent survey conducted by The Wall Street Journal (as 
this is written the strike is in i ts  seventh week) eventhe automobile indus- 
try reported enough steel in hand to last through two months of new model 
production this fall. Still more recently the same newspaper, on August 
26,1959, reported that warehouse inventories of steel had been only slightly 
affected by six weeks of strike. Stocks had fallen from 3,700,000 tons to 
3,125,000 tons. This meant that the steel-using industries had not yet had 
to look beyond their own stockpiles for industrial steel. 
What is true for the steel, automobile, and communications industries 
is true for industry as  a whole. Since 1951 production of durable goods 
has increased by 27 per cent, while the number of workers employed in 
this production has dropped by more than half a million. No less an author- 
ity than Dun's Review said in July, 1959, "Current output exceeds that of 
five years ago, although the number of production workers in manufactur- 
ing is down from 1954. " 
The effect of this rising productivity and excess plant construction on 
the bargaining power of labor ib obvious. Unemployment and partial em- 
ployment, for example, has become chronic in the steel industry, except 
for those short bursts of speed when an accumulationis being made to use 
as a weapon against labor' at bargaining time. 
Public subsidy of private industrial expansion through tax concessions. 
The rapid and uncontrolled introduction of automation into American indus- 
trial life has been made possible by the public funds which the cold war has 
made available to private industry in the form of tax concessions on the 
rate of depreciation in value of new plants. Without going into the techni- 
calities, it is sufficient to point out that in December, 1956, a staff report 
of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue described the rapid deprecia- 
tion tax schemes as "a form of special government assistance to private 
manufacturers, or,  bluntly, a subsidy. As early as  1951 the Dawson 
Committee reported that rapid tax depreciation was "the biggest bonanza 
that ever came down the government pike. And in December, 1958, The 
Wall Street Journal reported that the rapid depreciation laws of 1954 were 
Ifacting a s  a great new source of capital funds. 
In May, 1957, former Secretary of the Treasury George Humphrey testi- 
fiedbefore the Senate Finance Committee that up to that time tax deprecia- 
tion certificates had been issued for 22,000 construction and development 
projects of private industry costing $39 billion. More than $5 billion in 
withheld taxes was allowed. To make up for the loss of revenue caused by 
these withholdings, Secretary Humphrey estimated that the government 
would eventually pay $3 billion in interest costs. 
A case in point is the great Fairless steel mill at Morrisville, Pa. Ac- 
cording to a speech on the floor of the House of Representatives by Con- 
gressman Michael J. Kirwan, tax depreciation allowances on this one plant 
totaled $450 million. This plant is probably the most modern steel pro- 
ducing facility on earth. It has added substantially to the excess steel pro- 
ducing capacity of the steel industry of the United States, acapacity which 
i s  now being used to teach the steel workers and their union a lesson in 
the economics of cold war. 
These schemes were originally adopted a s  Dr. Win-the-War measures, 
through which government secured the full cooperation of industry in war 
production during the early days of World War 11. In 1950, when the Korean 
war started, this subsidy program was revived, and it was carried over 
into the post-Korean war period by legislation passed in 1954 by the 83rd 
Congress. This legislation allowed depreciation provisions to apply not 
only to defense industries, but also to non-defense industries. 
Though these tax subsidy "war babies1' are justified on the ground that 
new plants for private industry are  necessary to keep America militarily 
strong, they have beenused and are now being used to weaken labor's posi- 
tion. No matter what else may be shown by the steel strike of 1959, it 
cannot be deniedthat the steel industry's capacity to make all the steel our 
economy can use and yet stay shut down for months on end, is demonstrated 
convincingly. Industry can hold no heavier whip over those whom it em- 
ploys. Industry wouldnot have had this whip except for the tax concessions 
justified first by hot war and then by cold war. 
The administered price. Much was said during the 1958 recession about 
the phenomenon of the administered price whereby prices are  set not by 
competition, but by affixing a profit margin over costs and pricing the in- 
dividual items accordingly. This discussion still continues. Some deny 
that there is such a thing as administered price. Others say that it is noth- 
ing new. Some say it i s  economically desirable and others yearn for the 
free market place where prices follow consumer demand. 
Senator Estes Kefauver, Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Anti- 
trust and Monopoly, has reported convincing evidence regarding adminis- 
tered price practices and the effect on labor both in time of depression and 
in time of boom. Kefauver describes the administered price practices a s  
a "restrictionist policy of modern big businessmen under which price in- 
creases are made in the face of falling demandand substantial excess ca- 
pacity. w He comments, "A price policy which puts more money in the 
pockeb of the producers while at the same time further depressing an al- 
ready reduced level of demand and employment does not have much to com- 
mend it. " 
As examples of how the policy works inpractice, Senator Kefauver has 
cited the following: 
(1)Inflated profits. In July, 1957, an adjustment in steel wages was 
followed by price increases of steel. The wage boosts amounted to 
$2.50 or  $3.00 per ton of finished steel. The price increase was 
$6.00 a ton, more than twice the amount needed to cover increase 
wage costs, Actually, other factors, such a s  the falling price of 
steel scrap on a declining market, were more than enough to offset 
the cost of the wage increases to the steel companies, But prices 
were boosted anyway, with the result that steel industry net profits 
per ton hit an all-time high of $17.91 for 1957. This was an increase 
of $3.45 per ton over the previous year and it touched off other price 
rises throughout the economy. 
(2) The elimination of price competition. When U. S, Steel raised its 
prices in 1957 nearly all the other steel producers did the same thing 
by exactly the same amount. This was explained by the industry a s  
"meeting competition. '' At one point in the hearings conducted by 
the Subcommittee, Senator Kefauver asked Mr. Roger Blough, Chair- 
man of the Board of U. S. Steel, "Mr. Blough, do you regard it as 
true competition when another company matches your price to a thou- 
sandth of a cent per pound, o r  you match some other company's price 
to a thousandth of a cent per pound? Wouldn't itbe more competitive 
if there were at least some difference in these prices?" , 
Mr. Bloughreplied, "My concept is that a price that matches another 
price is a competitive price. If you don't accept that concept, then, 
of course, you don't accept it. " 
(3) Price r ises  in the face of falling demand. Senator Kefawer says that 
the administered price industries work it both ways. If demand in- 
creases, they raise prices because of the ''pressure" of demand on 
supply. If demand lags, "they raise prices because costs have risen, 
a s  overhead costs a re  spread over a smaller number of units." He 
cites the statement of t$e retiring president of the American Paper 
& Pulp Association in February, 1959, who said, "The nation's paper 
makers will be forced to raise prices if operations continue to lag. " 
Since lagging demand means decliningproduction and rising unemploy- 
ment, a policy of administered prices means that profits continue to go up 
a s  the buying power of the wage earners and those on fixed incomes shrink. 
According to the August 19, 1959, fact-finding report of Labor Secretary 
Mitchell on the steel strike of 1959, the wage-employee labor cost per ton 
of steel dropped from $47 in 1958 to $44 in 1959, while the realized price 
per ton rose from $171 to $173 during the same period. Meanwhile, pro- 
fits in all of industry were reaching new highs. According to The Wall 
Street Journal, the corporate profits for the second quarter of 1959 achieved 
"the largest gain for any three months, compared with a year earlier, 
since this newspaper began compiling records for several hundred com- 
panies, quarter by quarter. f i  Ananalysis of 428 companies showed second 
quarter profits in 1959 jumping 75.6 per cent over the previous year. Lead- 
ing participants in this profit-taking bonanza were automobiles with a 300 
per cent increase in profits, steel with 163 per cent, mining and metals 
with 123 per cent, railroads with 148 per cent, chemicals with 74 per cent, 
and rubber with 64.5 per cent. Meanwhile, the situation of the unemployed 
was far less  rosy. From a recession figure of 5.1 millions unemployed 
in April, 1958, the figure had dropped to 3.6 millions in April, 1959. This 
w a s  still 900,000 higher than the pre-recession figure of 2.7 millions un- 
employed in April, 1957. 
Industry is able to free itself from the controls of the market place and 
write its ownprice ticket to the extent that there is concentration of indus- 
trial control, and access to huge resources insulated from the exigencies 
of the free market. The cold war has accelerated monopolistic tendencies 
and has supplied vast, market-free, financial resources, a s  we have seen 
above. 
It is ~ rec i s e lv  in the industrial sectors where the cold war has its most 
dirkct ties that ihe institution of the administered price is most deeplyen- 
trenched. Gardiner Means. the father of the theorv of the administered - - - - - - - . -
price, has charted U. S. price trends by industry from 1953 to 1957. Dur- 
ing this period the industries which a re  still relatively remote from de- 
fense business, such as textiles, farm produce, lumber and wood, hides 
and leather, and processed foods, were competitive and reacted to the r ise  
o r  decline in demand. Prices in the mixed industries, where there is more 
centralization but still no strong military influence, such a s  fuel and power, 
furniture, and chemicals, went up, but lesd than ten per cent. Prices in 
the armaments producing sectors of the economy, including metal products, 
machinery, automobiles, aircraft, missiles, etc., soared nearly 20 per 
cent. This was in the teeth of a general market trend of lower consumer 
demand. It could only have happened if the. industries involved were heavily 
engaged in highly lucrative business which was far removed from the ef- 
fects of the open market on prices. That precisely is the situation of the 
large armaments producers, for it is they who get the bulk of the secretly 
negotiated cost-plus defense contracts with their guaranteed high profits. 
The tens of billions in defense contracts which a re  concentrated in the hands 
of the large aircraft, electronic, shipbuilding and vehicle combines each 
year a re  the backbone of the economic power that permits the power elite 
of modern industry to raise prices as demand falls, and to ride out each 
new recession confident that new weapons contracts, and new dreams of 
super weapons on their drawing boards will stimulate ever larger defense 
appropriations. 
THE NEW POWER RELATIONSHIPS OF COLD WAR ECONOMICS. 
Labor has its modern dream of an automated heaven where the old hobo 
song about the big rock candy mountain will be realized in terms of a four- 
day or even a three-day week, with everyone able to own his own home, 
car, and boat, send his kids to college, and retire while still young on a 
pension of $400 a month. There is nothing wrong with this dream. It is 
good. We ought to have it. The productivity of modern industry, and the 
potentials just ahead bring such dreams into the realm of possibility for 
all people everywhere. But the possible is not going to become probable 
so long as the realities of economic power which are  generated by the cold 
war divert the attention of the people from their hopes to their fears and 
rob them of the capacity to realize what their own abilities 
reach. 
The labor movement in the past has made substantial contr 
realization of the dreams of workingpeople. The 
ing and garment industry have been transformed by unions. The goon squad 
practices of the automobile and rubber industries have been replaced by 
collective bargaining. The terror imposed on coal miners and steel work- 
e r s  by the private industrial police of 40 years ago is now a nearly forgotten 
chapter of history. These changes came because unions achievedpower and 
used it in a responsible way. Today also there cannot be chaqges unless 
there is a new acquisition of power by the people and a responsible use of 
it in the interest of humanity. Automation maybe an instrument but it will 
- 
not be used for the good of society automatically. 
The cold war has placed enormous economic power in the hands of a 
small number of scientists, engineers, industrialists, and military men 
who collaborate in private about how billions of dollars shall be spent on 
weapons. Labor has little o r  no part in their deliberations. It may be a 
prestige factor for a labor leader to be taken on a highly confidential tour 
of restricted weapons testing areas. But the basic decisions affecting the 
economy are  being made without labor being consulted. 
The cold war has placed a large excess plant capacity in the hands of 
private industry, and given industry power over labor in collective bar- 
gaining matters. To accept the conditions of the cold war is to accept the 
system that creates the new power situation. 
In 1958 a tragic accident took the lives of two civilian mechanics at a 
Nike missile base in New Jersey. The widow of one explained why her 
husband had requested a transfer from repairing automobiles to modifying 
Nikes, saying, "We thought there would be more security in missiles be- 
cause they seemed to be the coming thing. " In the big missiles tool-up 
of 1959 the entire labor movement, and indeedour entire economy, is act- 
ing in the same way, and faces the same tragic possibility. 
In many ways the cold war has served unions well. Their institutional 
and financial situation is strong. They have more members than ever be- 
fore. Strikes and bargaining may drag out, but usually there is no threat 
of strike-breaking and no doubt about the end result, give o r  take a little. 
But so far a s  participation in basic economic and political decisions is 
concerned, the cold war has dealt the unions out rather than in. Today we 
a r e  told that we must make every sacrifice to catch up with Russia in mis- 
siles o r  to keep pace with her nuclear development. But it is not clear who 
will be asked to sacrifice what. The unions are  supposed to sacrifice their 
wage increases. The fixed ipcome people a re  supposed to tighten their 
belts in the face of administered price increases. The farmers are  urged 
to sacrifice their parity protections. But what of the industrial giants and 
the weapons systems makers? Will they sacrifice the cost-plus features 
of their contracts 7 Will they forego their tax concessions ? Will their 
directors and managers apply wage and salary restraint to themselves ? 
Will they abandon their collaboration on prices and profits ? Let us be 
realistic. Not so long a s  they can help it; and, thanks to the power rela- 
tionships of cold war, they can help it. 
THE COLD WAR AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
It is a tribute to the people of organized labor and to their leaders that, 
generally speaking, individual or group interest is not the controlling 
factor in deciding conduct or policy where issues of national security a r e  
at stake. Even though it be true that the cold war works to the disadvantage 
of labor, if it is also true that acceptance of the conditions of cold war is 
a requirement of loyal and patriotic citizenship, there can be little doubt 
what mostworking people and most unions would do. They would accept it. 
Indeed, that is precisely what they have done for the past 12years and that 
is what they a re  doing today. 
But has the cold war actually strengthened us a s  a nation and made us 
more secure? That has been our declared purpose from the start of the 
cold war. We have felt that our interests have been threatened by the 
Soviet Union, and we have been told that we must wage the cold war to 
achieve a position of strength so that we could deal with her effectively 
and peacefully. The cold war has been our bid to win peace through 
strength. That has been our purpose. But how has it worked out? Has the 
cold war made us strong? 
If weapons bring military security, we should be the most secure people 
of all time. If we had had in 1941 the weapons we have today, World War 
I1 could have been won in a week. At the end of WorldWar I1 we had block- 
buster bombs which exploded with the power of ten tons of TNT. Today a 
single H-bomb is two million times a s  powerful a s  one of those World War 
I1 monsters, and we have them stockpiled in massive quantities. 
At the end of World War I1 our submarines had practically wiped out 
enemy shipping. Our submarine fleet was made up of conventional craft 
which had to surface at. night to recharge their batteries. They fired tor- 
pedoes only slightly improved over the World War I brand. Today our 
nuclear submarines can stay submerged for weeks at a stretch, and they 
soon will fire missiles with nuclear warheads. In future war not only sur- 
face ships, but cities hundreds of miles from the sea will be easy submarine 
targets. This will be true both of Russian and American cities, but Russian 
cities a r e  far from the oceans, while most of ours a re  on or near the sea. 
At the end of World War PI massive fleets of long range bombers could 
carry thousands of tons of explosives a thousand miles and drop them on 
the helpless cities of the enemy. Scores of cities were wiped out. Today 
the speed and range of these great ships have been doubled and trebled, 
and we a re  now moving into the period when even the fastest and most 
powerful bombers will be obsolete because intercontinental ballistic mis- 
siles capable of speeds of 18,000 mph will be on their launching pads, 
ready to be fired at targets six or eight thousand miles away. These ICBM's 
will carry H-bombs, each one of which has greater explosive power than 
all of the bombs exploded in all of the wars from the beginning of time 
down through the end of World War II! In another world war we must ex- 
pect that nations will die. 
Our weapons strength is enlarged by military pacts and alliances with 
more than 40 countries which provide us with military bases located in a 
vast global arc  encircling the communist countries, giving us the means 
of attacking strategic targets quickly and from many directions. 
In short, we have the weapons to destroy anything we want to, and to do 
it quickly. Still we a re  not secure. Instead, a s  our military strength has 
grown we have become less and less secure. 
These a re  the reasons: 
1. The Problem of Soviet Power. The Soviet Union also has vastly 
destructive weapons. Her bombs a re  a s  big a s  ours. Her bomber fleets 
a r e  a s  fast and powerful a s  ours. Her long range missiles a r e  more pow- 
erful than ours and she reportedly is months or years ahead of us in 
quantity missile production. Her submarine fleet is larger than ours, the 
largest ever built. Missile experts say that even with a maximum effort 
i t  would take us five years to catch up with Russia in missile production 
and development, and they are  not able to guarantee that we can do it even 
then, for Russia may continue to move ahead a s  rapidly a s  we do. 
th 2. The N Power. Problem. Soon, unless there i s  a universal ban on 
nuclear tests, instead of three countries possessing nuclear weapons, 
many nations will have them. According to a recent report, 12 countries 
not now possessing nuclear weapons will be able to produce their own 
within five years. This will greatly increase the danger of war. Inter,- 
national control of armaments and nuclear tests will become nearly im- 
possible. The danger of irresponsible provocation will increase. Tottering 
governments always are  tempted to risk desperate adventures and ours is 
a time of tottering governments. 
3. War by Accident or Mistake. As missile weapons a re  developed 
and deployed around the earth the danger of war being touched off by 
accident or mistake will increase. Obscure soldiers in remote places will 
be required to read their radar screens accurately and decide in minutes 
whether to launch their missiles or hold fire. Time will be all-important. 
Attacking missiles will reach their targets in a matter of minutes. Wild 
geese, meteors, or orbiting spgce vehicles can be mistaken for attacking 
missiles. Men under the strain and tension of having to make hair-trigger 
judgments may suffer nervous collapse. A single mistake, a single lapse 
of judgment by a missile launching control post can ignite the flames of 
total nuclear war. 
4. Suitcase Bombs and Sneak Attack. Nuclear scientists have de- 
clared that llsuit case missiles" may already be llplantedll in the cities 
and the industrial areas of-the world. Highly portable "suit case" bombs 
have been developed which explode with the force of thousands of tons of 
TNT. An intransigent dictator of a small nation, with little to gain from 
peace and little to lose from chaos, could plant a bomb and start a war. 
A routine smuggling operation and a secondhand truck is all the organiza- 
tion and equipment he would need. It could be done in such a way as to 
leave the victim country guessing a s  to the true identity of the culprit. 
War could come without anyone knowing who had started it. But that would 
not make the initial blow any less terrible nor the ensuing war any less 
devastating. 
5. The Danger of Nuclear Tests. Even the developing and testing of 
nuclear weapons is a hazard to world health both now and for generations 
to come. Every nuclear explosion creates radioactive fallout. Some of the 
radioactive materials a r e  short-lived, but some remain active for months 
or years. One of the most dangerous is strontium 90 with a half-life (the 
length of time i t  takes for half of its strength to rot away) of 28 years. 
Strontium 90 is like calcium. It is taken up through the soil into the 
grasses that cows eat o r  it settles on the blades of grass after it has been 
washed down out of the sky by rain o r  snow. It gets into the milk and when 
the milk is drunk the strontium 90, like calcium, is taken into the bones 
and is accumulated and stored there, remaining radioactive for years. 
Before the first  nuclear explosion there was no strontium90 in our atmos- 
phere, soil, or seas. Today, thanks to nuclear explosions, everyone on 
earth has it stored in his bones. Children a r e  affected more than adults 
because their bones a r e  growing. Just a s  they require more calcium than 
adults, so their bodies store more strontium 90 than the bones of adults 
do. 
Strontium 90 can cause leukemia and other forms of cancer. No one is 
quite sure just how much strontium 90 it takes in a given instance to cause 
leukemia, nor can any particular case be identified a s  to the cause. Only 
a small proportion of all  leukemia is thought to be caused by nuclear fall- 
out radiation. But leading scientists meeting a t  Pugwash, Nova Scotia, 
estimated in the summer of 1957 that the tests up to then would probably 
cause 100,000 leukemia and cancer deaths before the radioactive materials 
which had been released into the atmosphere would have rotted away. This 
represents only a small fraction of a per cent of all the deaths due to cancer 
that will occur during the next several generations. But a s  Prof. Harrison 
Brown of the California Institute of Technology has said, "We would not 
dream of lining thousands of people against a wall and shooting them down 
in order to test a new machine gun. But this in effect is what the U. S. , 
the U. S. S. R. , and the U. K. do when we test these fantastic new weapons. l f  
Nuclear tests not only injure the present generation but also damage 
babies yet unborn. Some of the rays caused by nuclear tests reach the 
gonads and affect the genetic materials which a r e  essential to human re- 
production. Genetic mutations (changes in the reproduction cells) occur 
a s  a result. These mutations a r e  usually harmful, causing either injury 
or death. Even when genetic damage is slight, it is passed on from one 
generation to the next, producing an accumulation of life damage through 
many generations. 
There is general agreement that the percentage of births affected by 
genetic damage from fallout radiation so far i s  slight. But the same 
scientists who estimated that the nuclear tests conducted up to the summer 
of 1957 would cause 100,000 cases of leukemia, predicted a like number 
of deaths eventually from harmful genetic mutations caused by those same 
nuclear explosions. Since that time our government has conducted exten- 
sive tests, both in the South Pacific and in Nevada, and Britain and the 
Soiiet Union have engaged in somewhat fewer tests. These tests of 1957 
and 1958 have doubled the load of radioactive materials in the stratosphere. 
This means that even more deaths from leukemia and genetic injury will 
occur than was predicted at  Pugwash two years ago. 
Indeed, a s  scientific knowledge is extended the warning of nuclear fall- 
out dangers becomes more and more ominous. For instance, it was 
learned in 1958 that each nuclear explosion (even including the so-called 
"clean" H-bombs) releases carbon 14, a dangerous radioactive material 
which attacks the chemical bonds of human cells. At first this danger was 
minimized by the AEC and other supporters of nuclear tests. Today it is 
widely accepted a s  one of the most hazardous of the byproducts of nuclear 
explosions. And in 1959 it was admitted by the AEC that radioactive 
materials released by nuclear explosions return to the earth much faster 
than had been thought. This means that the soil, vegetation, and animal 
life of our world (that includes all of us) receive a heavier and a more 
varied radioactive attack from the materials thrown off by nuclear explo- 
sions than previous calculations indicated. 
Thus we live under two nuclear perils: swift destruction of all life on 
earth from total nuclear war (there a re  some scientists employed by the 
armed forces who claim it will not be all life but only one half or one 
fourth!), and the slow radioactive contamination of the atmosphere from 
continued and extended nuclear tests. 
However, two reassurances a re  offered by those who still believe that 
we must continue pursuit of the cold war arms race. First, they say that 
wars can be limited to restricted areas and confined to the use of non- 
nuclear weapons and to smaller nuclear weapons. Second, they say that 
the way to assure peace is to maintain a balance of power great enough to 
deter any aggressor. j 
Let us examine both of these reassurances. 
1. The Doctrine of Limited War 
There i s  no question that limited wars do occur in the atomic age. Not 
every war blossoms into total war. Since World War I1 there have been 
limited wars , or wars that did not become unlimited, in Korea, Guatemala, 
Greece, Hungary, Egypt, Algeria, Oman, Kashmir , Vietnam, Burma, 
Malaya, Indonesia, Cuba, China, Iraq, Lebanon, and the Formosa Straits. 
In most of these no dangerous threat of totalwar developed. But in several 
there were days and weeks of great tension when almost anything could 
have happened. This was true in Korea in 1950 and 1951, in Vietnam in 
1954, in the Formosa Straits in 1955 and again in 1958, in Hungary and 
Egypt in the fall of 1956, and in Iraq and Lebanon in the late summer of 
1958. 
In any one of these conflicts a single rash step by an over-eager soldier 
or a political or military leader could have touched off World War 111. 
General MacArthur wanted to attack China in 1951 but was restrained. 
Suppose he had not been? Vice-President Nixon openly toyed with armed 
intervention in Vietnam in 1954 but his suggestion was vetoed. Suppose he 
had had his way? High military advisors urged punitive measures against 
China in 1954, but President Eisenhower heeded more prudent voices. 
Suppose he had been ill at the time? Britain, France, and Israel stopped 
short and pulled back from Egypt in 1956 when they were confronted by 
demands from President Eisenhower and Mr. Khrushchev. Suppose they 
had plunged ahead? 
If Syngman Rhee had had nuclear weapons in 1951 the chances a r e  he 
would have used them. If Chiang Kai-shek had them today, he might do 
the same. How can anyone say that if we play the limited war game, limit- 
ed war will never become unlimited? No one can give such guarantees. 
It simply is not enough to show that limited wars happen.-en total 
war means total destruction it is necessary also to show that no limited 
war will become unlimited. That is an assurance that the advocates of 
preparations for limited war a r e  unable to give. They fall back on talk 
about calculated risks, but they do not tell us how they can calculate r isks 
which involve powers of destruction beyond calculation, and hatreds and 
ambitions which, once released, quickly go beyond control. The hazards 
of destruction become even less calculable a s  nuclear weapons and mis- 
siles a r e  stockpiled a t  distant bases on the territories of foreign govern- 
ments, many of which a r e  frustrated, unstable, and given to noisy sword 
rattling a s  a cover-up for their own inadequacies. 
2. Peace through Deterrence 
As a corollary to hopes that wars can be kept limited there is the hope 
that aggressors can be restrained through the deterrent power of threatened 
retaliation. This means that we must protect ourselves from attack by 
giving the potential aggressor the absolute assurance that he will be des- 
troyed if  he starts  anything. But what if the enemy hits us so  hard in the 
first blow that we cannot hit back? According to the analysis of the study 
of the National Planning Association, 1970 Without Arms Control, "the 
'push-button for the dead man's hand' sort  of device is likely to receive 
careful attention, Such a device could be set off by blast, heat, explosion, 
o r  radiation levels. " In other words, we would place our missiles in un- 
derground launching sites where they would be relatively immune to enemy 
attack. Then, using automatic triggers which would not require a live 
man's hand to set them off, we would live in the confident knowledge that 
if the enemy at  one blow wiped out our cities and killed us all, we would 
still have our revenge even after we were dead, for our missiles would 
be set flying toward his cities a s  soon as the heat, the blast, o r  the ra- 
diation levels from his bombs reached the triggering point. Revenge re- 
ally is not the word. We would not set up this machinery hoping for post- 
humous revenge, but in order that the enemy would be completely con- 
vinced that he would be signing his own death warrant if he attacked us, 
regardless of the success of his initial blow. 
Surely if anything would deter an aggressor, this would be it. But will 
i t? Perhaps it would deter some aggressors and not deter others. Let us 
take an example. Suppose we had our "dead man's hand" deterrence 
perfected and Russia had hers. We would each be deterring each other. 
If either fired H-bombs against the other both would die. But suppose some 
discontented satellite o r  ally, o r  some erratically led neutral country de- 
cided that the world would be a better place without either Russia o r  the 
United States. What would keep such a country from smuggling a few H- 
bombs of the suitcase variety into strategic areas where they could be 
fired? Then both the United States and the Soviet Union would automati- 
cally start killing each other off. The "dead man's hand" would pull the 
trigger while men were still alive. The chances are ,  of course, that the 
radiation caused by such a massive exchange of obliteration weapons would 
kill everyone, including the inhabitants of the country that started it. But 
that would not be certain, and even if it were, what might deter our enemies 
might not deter our friends, among whom there are  some not noted for 
their reliability and devotion to the cause of democracy and freedom. 
Today we have not yet reached the point of absolute threat of massive 
retaliation. But we are  in a transition stage of progress toward it, and 
this itself is an exposed and provocative situation. Russia may not be so  
far  ahead of us in missiles today that she could knock us  out without re- 
ceiving heavy blows in return. But she soon may be far  enough ahead to 
expect to somehow survive a short, sharp war which would utterly destroy 
us. If she sees the situation in this light, thinking only in terms of the 
military meanings of security, what is the prudent thing for her to do? 
Should she strike and take her chances, knowing that delay may permit us 
to catch up and possibly go out in front of her?  Or should she wait and 
hope that the future will not reduce us both to the helpless condition of the 
totally armed and the totally deterred? Whatwould we do if we had her in 
such a situation of disadvantage? We once had her in something of that 
situation when, at  the beginning of the cold war, we had the A-bomb and 
she did not. But we do not have her there now. If we should get signifi- 
cantly ahead of her again, would we dare run the risk a second time of 
letting her try to catch up? 
, 
The above paragraph is written not for the purpose of saying what either 
we or  the Russians would do in a given situation., but to point up the vola- 
tile nature of the cold war and to show that there is a s  much in our a rms  
race to provoke attack a s  to deter it. 
A stable balance of power may well be a deterrent. But what we have 
is something else. We have an unstable balance of ter ror  combined with 
constantly fluctuating relationships of power. This is dangerous in the ex- 
treme. 
To go back to our first quest!on, has the cold war strengthened us and 
made us more secure? According to some definitions it may have strength- 
ened us. We can do far more damage today than we could 12 years ago. 
But we a re  far less secure. Twelve years ago Russia was not capable of 
destroying us. Today, probably she is. Twelve years ago we enjoyed ex- 
clusive possession of nuclear weapons. Today Russia has them too, and 
she has missiles to deliver them which are  several years ahead of ours. 
Twelve years ago a massive attack upon our shores, either from the sea 
o r  the a i r  was unthinkable. Today Russia has, o r  is about to have, long 
range missiles and missile launching submarines capable of deep pene- 
trating attack on all our major cities. In short, the cold war has not 
strengthened us. It has not made us more secure. We are  in greater 
peril than when the cold war began, and all the billions spent have pro- 
duced a r m s  which expose us and all humanity to perils greater than his- 
tory has ever seen before. 
The primary concern of organized labor in national security is not a 
special o r  class matter, but a concern which working people share with 
the res t  of the population. Labor must always be willing to submerge her 
special interests where the national interest requires it. Labor has sup- 
ported foreign policy duringthe cold war and has supported national lead- 
ership in its efforts to achieve a position of strength. But patriotism does 
not require support of a course which has been tried and has failed. It is 
not loyal to remain silent a s  we move inexorably toward final disaster. 
It is good citizenship to dissent boldly when continued assent means des- 
truction. 
The missiles which the working men and women of the United States and 
the Soviet Union are  manufacturing today will soon be stored in handy stock- 
piles o r  poised on launching pads. When they a re  fired they will streak 
through outer space at  18,000 miles per hour. Their targets will be the 
cities and the industrial areas where the working men and womendotheir 
jobs, live their lives, and provide their children with whatever security 
life in this century is able to offer. 
History tells us that arms races end in war, that huge stores of dead- 
ly weapons a r e  finally used. Yet this could be a time of greater security 
than man has ever known. The cold war has done more than produce 
weapons of mass destruction. By pouring many hundreds of billions of 
dollars into a r m s  it has denied to the people of the earth a chance to 
enjoy what, after many centuries of human effort, mankind a t  last has 
learned to produce. 
There is no security in cold war, but only ever greater hazard. When 
workers a re  told to sacrifice their economic powers for the sake of the 
security the cold war can bring to the nation, they a re  really being asked 
to sacrifice their owninterests in the pursuit of a course which has led us 
ever deeper into areas  of deadly peril. 
I11 
THE COLD WAR AND WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Has the cold war strengthened our efforts to promote world economic 
development? Americans a re  like millionaires surrounded by slums. 
There is a relationship between economic well-being and political stabili- 
ty. We cannot have political stability if we grow richer while our neighbors 
go hungry. The best safeguard against dictatorship is prosperity and de- 
mocracy. Communism is really three things. It is a power system. It 
i s  an idea. And it is a system of organizing the productive capacities of 
people. People who are  submerged in poverty and see no hope in their 
situation turn to communism, not because they want to lose their freedom 
r but because they know nothing about freedom. They have never had it. They are  not interested in the freedom to go hungry. From the very be- 
ginning of the coldwar we have spent money and skill helping underdevel- 
oped countries learn to help themselves. The aim has been to provide an 
economic base for freedom and democracy. 
The need is great. The billion o r  more people who live in Southern 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America have an average per capita income of 
less  than $80 per year. In many of these lands there a re  vast differences 
in income. ASaudi Arabianprince gets millions from oil revenues but his 
nomad tribal kinsman will have nothing. AnIndian merchant, manufactur- 
e r ,  or ex-maharajah may enjoy an income running into hundreds of thou- 
sands of rupees but the average Indian industrial worker earns between 
30b and 6 5b a day, depending on the place and the kind of work. And there 
is an astronomical gap between the income of an African tribesman and a 
prosperous European settler. 
Poverty, illiteracy, malnutrition, and disease go together. In much of 
Asia and the Middle East illiteracy runs 80 percent o r  higher. The mini- 
mum daily food requirement to maintain health and decency is 2500 calor- 
ies, but in the underdeveloped countries the average person gets only 2000 
calories or less. In some countries, such a s  India and China, the popu- 
lation a s  awhole has hovered at  the borderline between mild malnutrition 
and actual starvation for genenations. 
Life expectancy inthe United States i s  about 70 years but in the under- 
developed countries it averages about 30 years at  birth. The availability 
of doctors and the skill and trainingpf doctors varies widely. In the United 
States there is a doctor for every 750 people. In India the ratio is one to 
6000 people. In some countries the situation is even worse. 
These conditions had remainedvery much the same for a hundred years 
prior to the end ofworld War 11 when there began to develop a stirring and 
a discontent. During the past 1 2  years most of Asia has won political in- 
dependence. Africa is now in the midst of political revolution and counter- 
revolution. In Latin America the dictators are  being unceremoniously 
tossed out of their armed nests . Nationalism is running like a tide through 
the Middle East. 
The people of all of these lands want two things. They want a better 
life, and they want respect. 
Economically their new governments' common problem is to accumu- 
late capital goods (plants, roads, factories, mines, transportation and 
harbor facilities, etc. ) and to achieve a system of production and distri- 
bution which will hold the loyalty of, and give work incentive to, the peo- 
ple. 
The effect of China on the res t  of Asia is not to be discounted, nor should 
we forget that our strong support of Chiang Kai-shek in the cold war pro- 
vides the Chinese Communist leaders with a convenient "hate" symbol to 
use in stimulating their people to ever greater efforts. People who have 
lived under the economic and political dominance of foreigners for more 
than a century, suddenly find they can move ahead despite strong foreign 
opposition. What could stimulate them more? While we huff and puff to 
keep Chiang Kai-shek in power on Taiwan, the communist leaders of China 
use our cold war efforts to strengthen themselves. If jiu-jitsu is turning 
the strength of the opponent against himself, this is political jiu-jitsu. 
Elsewhere we have been persuaded by cold war rivalries to put military 
aid far ahead of economic aid. Duringthe first 11 years following the end 
of World War I1 we provided aid totaling 57 billion dollars to other coun- 
tries. Half of that amount ($28,400,000,000) went to help war-ravaged in- 
dustrial countries restore their industrial and economic life. Thirty-two 
per cent ($18,000,000,000) went for military equipment which we distrib- 
uted among the 40 odd nations with which we have had military pacts. Of 
the remaining 18 per cent, $3,500,000,000 went for relief to refugees and 
other war victims, $3,800,000,000 providedeconomic assistance to main 
defense- support countries*, including Korea, Formosa, and Indo-China, 
and the remaining $3,300,000,000 (six per cent of the total) was distrib- 
uted a s  economic assistance among 75 underdeveloped countries with a 
total population of 1,150,000,000 people. $53,700,000,000 on wars, past, 
present, and future, and $3,300,000,000 on non-defense economic aid; that 
is how our aid program has been apportioned. The people of the under- 
developed countries not holding military alliances with the United States 
got, on the average, 26b each per year. Our per capita aid to the people 
of the defense support countries was seven times a s  much. 
This policy of heavy emphasis on guns and bases, while the economic 
needs of the people are  neglected unless there is military alignment, has 
had the following results: 
1. Our actions have spoken louder than our words. People of other 
lands simply do not believe us when we claim our aid has "no strings at- 
tached. " 
2. For the sake- of military pacts we have supported dictators who have 
used our trade and aid to suppress rather thanencourage democratic gov- 
ernment s and, incidentally, to keep themselves in power. 
* Defense support countries (12 at present) receive extra economic help 
to buttress their political and economic stability in the interest of under- 
girding their military pacts with the United States. 
Examples include: 
(a) Saudi Arabia. Here a handful of wealthy sheiks reap enormous 
wealth from U. S. oil, trade, and aid while the people live in poverty. The 
price of slaves in Saudi Arabia has gone up a s  oil revenues have mounted 
during the past ten years. When a strike occurred in Saudi Arabia at  an 
American-owned oil refinery in 1953, it was ruthlessly suppressed. Mar- 
tial law was declared because the workers were said to be demanding wage 
increases. According to a press report of the International Confederation 
of Free Trade Unions: "500 workers were imprisoned, 80 of whom were 
poisoned with scorpionsand subjected to burning, pulling out of nails, and 
other forms of torture. " 
Two years later our government was discovered to be shipping tanks to 
Saudi Arabia. When friends of Israel protested, the U. S. State Depart- 
ment explained that the tanks were not to be used against Israel but to main- 
tain "internal security. " It was not explained how the use of tanks for 
this purpose would serve democracy. It is not surprisingthat the oil sheiks 
of the Arabiandesert would need tanks to protect themselves against their 
people. But it is a sad commentary on the cold war when the United States 
uses it as an excuse for acting a s  an arsenal of this brand of "desert de- 
mocracy. " 
@)Korea. According to the cliches of the cold war, the mantle 
of the "free world" is draped around Syngman Rhee. We fought a "limit+ 
edpp war and spent billions of dollars to protect freedom and democracy in 
Korea, but all we have accomplished is to keep Rhee in power. Rhee has 
proved to be tyrannical and ruthless. He suppresses newspapers which dis- 
agree with him. He uses his police force to bully the legislature into pass- 
ing laws which wipe out civil rights. He openly threatens war against North 
Korea. And his strong-arm led trade unions a r e  instruments to control 
industrial workers rather than represent their interests. 
(c) Franco's Rule of Spain. Internal unrest and opposition to 
Franco has grown during the past decade but he has managed to maintain 
power with the help of U. S. military aid. At the end of World War 11 we 
wanted no part of Franco, but our desire for military bases changed things. 
Today he is our ally in the cold war. His methods of control have not 
changed. Newspapers a re  still suppressed. Freedom of worship is still 
denied. Political dissent is driven underground. Trade union rights do 
not exist, Anyone who protests is jailed. 
(d) The list could be extended to include Chiang Kai-shek, the now 
departed Bao Dai, and such Latin American dictators and ex-dictators a s  
Batista and Trujillo, to say nothing of the last vestiges of colonial rule to 
which our European allies cling in Africa. 
In all of these our cold war commitments have driven us to side with the 
forces of dying tyranny rather than with the hopes of those who sacrifice 
for a brighter day. 
3. Because some countries have refused to enter military pacts 'with 
us, we have let democracy flounder in crisis  areas. The prime example 
is India. Indiarepresents the last major democratic opportunity in Asia. 
If she abandons democracy there will be no place else of size and impor- 
tance in Asia to give i t  a try. Yet instead of extending all-out aid to her 
economic development we have been carping and niggardly because she re- 
fused to join our ring of military alliances. Meanwhile countries that have 
given up on democracy, o r  have never tried it, get all the dollars they 
want. 
During the three years 1954-56 U. S. aid went to the following countries 
as indicated: 
Country* 
Population 
(millions) 
Total 
economic 
aid 
(million $) * * 
Aid 
received 
per capita 
per annum 
India 
South Korea 
Formosa 
Pakistan 
* South Korea, Formosa, and Pakistanhave military pacts with the U. S. 
India does not. 
** These figures do not include military aid. 
4. Military pacts with one country have stimulated military expenditures 
in neighboring countries where every cent is needed for economic develop- 
ment. Again with India, half of her budget goes for arms. She justifies 
this on the ground that the a rms  we supply Pakistanthreatenher. We may 
deplore this reasoning but the fact remains that U. S. a rms  to Pakistan 
mean fewer tractors, factories, and irrigation projects for India. It is no 
validation of India's fears to point out that they a re  characteristic of the 
a r m s  race atmosphere, and in fairness she deserves credit for her per- 
sistent refusal to accept a cold war alignment. 
5. Cold war rivalries for markets and economic penetration between the 
two world giants, the United States and the Soviet Union, set  economic 
competition at  a level which the underveloped countries cannot possi- 
bly meet. Until the newly independent countries are able to develop in- 
dustrially, they will need tariff and other protections against the competi- 
tive power of the Western industrial countries. Such protections will not 
be possible in an atmosphere of cutthroat economic competition between 
the United States and the Soviet Union. The more the Soviet Union chal- 
lenges us in foreign trade the less  willing we shall be to permit Asian goods 
to compete on the American market. 
The cold war has been a period of economic difficulty for the underde- 
veloped countries. India has had to cut back on her development plans. 
Most of the new governments of SouthernAsiahave turned from represen- 
tative leadership to military strong men in an effort to maintain national 
unity in a period of growing economic crisis. In Latin America the wise- 
spread discontent with our cold war economic policies has found expression 
in such ugly incidents a s  mob assaults on the American vice-president. 
The cold war has magnified rather than solved the economic difficulties 
of the underdeveloped areas of the world. OnlyinChinaare there reports 
of rapid and confident progress. Our emphasis on spears rather than 
plowshares, on building military bases rather than combating hunger and 
poverty, has caused confidence in America to dwindle, and despair to mount 
over our failure to come to grips with the real issues. The people of those 
lands do not want preachments about freedom, nor military equipment and 
bases, but food, clothing, work, and a better life. They a re  willing to 
work for it but they need intelligent help. 
Has the cold war strengthened our efforts to promote world economic 
development? The answer is that it  has not. It has diverted foreign aid 
into unproductive and wasteful channels. Economic aid to underdeveloped 
countries has been the cow's tail and military aggrandizement has been the 
cow. The reach of working people of Asia and Africa for a better life and 
human dignity has exceeded their grasp. Thwarted by petty strong men 
and military governors kept in power by U. S. supplied arms, they a r e  
beginning to despair of finding a democratic answer for their economic 
problems. 
The trade unions of America a re  expressing dismay a t  the quantity of 
consumer goods on the American market whichwere manufactured in other 
lands by workers paid starvation wages. What can be done to halt the corh- 
petition of sweat shop goods from overseas? Talk of quota systems and 
higher tariffs is self-defeating. The very countries against which such 
measures would need to be most stringently applied a re  the same countries 
which we cannot afford to offend for reasons of cold war military alliances. 
Even if restrictions could be made effective they would be shortsighted and 
ultimately disastrous, for the world of privilege cannot be hedged off from 
the world of need. The only real  answer is an all-out attack on the condi- 
tions which produce the sweat shops in the first place, a renewal of that 
spirit which opposes al l  special privilege and accepts the challenge of 
identification with the needs, the aspirations, and the rising expectations 
of working people everywhere t 
In the realm of foreign policy we need to ask ourselves how such a 
spirit can find expression in concrete policy. Can the trade unions be- 
come means whereby the ideals of brotherhood and justice may be applied 
to policies of trade, aid, and cultural exchange among the nations? 
IV 
WHAT CAN BE DONE? 
It is not the purpose of this pamphlet to offer pat answers but rather to 
raise a warning about continued reliance on military solutions for economic 
and social problems both a t  home and abroad. We hold that no solution can 
be found which ignores the following facts: 
1. The first need is for the trade unions and the working people to face 
the fact that the cold war has not worked out. Democracy has not been 
strengthened, neither has the Soviet Union nor China been contained. A 
position of strength has not been achieved. We a r e  in greater danger than 
we were when the cold war started. And there is no indication that this 
situation will change, It will grow worse if the cold war continues. 
2. The second fact which must be faced is that nearly a billion people 
a r e  governed bv communist r e a m e s  and this situation shows no sign of 
3. Third. the real  test of democracv todav is not whether we can make 
mo&ins o> destructive weapons but whethe; the people of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America can find the rgad toward a better life within a frame- 
work of democracy. If not, all of the weapons in the world will not save 
democracy. If they can and do, democracy will  have a place in the world's 
future, and the world will have a future. 
4, Fourth, threats, hostility, and cold war drive communist countries 
into tight alliances and stimulate their r e ~ r e s s i v e  tendencies. In that they 
a r e  n 2  unlike us. But relaxationof tensiins can offer opportunities. ~ f l  
t e r  all, no state, no matter how hard it tries, can ever be completely 
monolithic. The Soviet Union has tried to crush religion but crowds of 
people still openly attend services of worship. It has tried to crush criti- 
cal  thought, but there is still apasternak. It has tried to adhere to a rigid 
doctrine but it has been driven to make revisions and changes. What has 
changed already can be changed still further. 
5. Fifth, this is not the first time that vast ideological warfare has been 
waged, yet people have been able to compose their differences and live in 
the world with each other. Today there a re  no holy wars between Christ- 
ians and Islam, though once each considered it good in the eyes of God to 
kill the other. There is not such vast difference between East and West 
today that we must resort  to mass suicide. 
6. Last, any course we take will involve risks. There is no foolproof 
way to disarm, but neither is there a foolproof way to pursue an a rms  race. 
There is no foolproof way to stop nuclear tests, but neither is there any 
safe way to continue them. There a r e  no foolproof, built-in guarantees 
that if we trust Russia our trust will not be betrayed. But neither is there 
any likelihood that we shall avoid disaster if we a r e  unwilling to run a few 
r isks  for the sake of peace. 
A cold war which drags out and becomes chronic may provide briefly 
a precarious base for wage increases, but it destroys labor's dream of a 
peaceful and productive world, and thereby strikes a heavy blow at the 
greatest treasure labor has, the treasure of an ultimate ideal. 
We have come too far toward disaster to save ourselves by half mea- 
sures. The hope that we can keep on building more missiles and more 
bombs and, at  the same time, winthe cold war on the economic front is a 
false hope and will betray us as every other cold war hope has betrayed us. 
The only way out is to turn from cold war and start buildingaprosperous, 
democratic world. 
At the beginning of this pamphlet we asked whether labor should support 
a new foreign policy. 
The old foreign policy has failed the American people and it has failed 
the people of organized labor in the following particulars: 
1. It has deliveredpower over the economy into the hands of the Penta- 
gon and those who make the decisions in the larger corporations. 
2. It has projected us into rapid technological change without adequate 
social controls. 
3. It has crippled both labor and the consumer in the exercise of their 
rightful economic powers in the market place. 
\ 
4. It has exposed the people of the world to radioactive poison. 
5. It has magnifiedthe destructive powers of war and brought war per- 
ilously close. 
6. It has delivered us into the embrace of irresponsible allies, and 
alienated our natural friends. 
7. It has stimulated the harsh tendencies of the communist countries 
and silenced voices of moderation. 
8. It has diverted funds and energy from the constructive tasks of world 
development into military build-ups which are  irrelevant to the needs of 
the underdeveloped lands. 
9. It has degraded our moral purposes. 
If enormous sums of money and effort go into means of mass annihila- 
tion, we may say it serve8 democracy, but actually it does not. Democracy 
becomes corrupted a s  human life becomes cheap. Everything comes under 
the shadow of destruction and fear. Humanity loses its confidence in its 
own purposes and even in its own chance to survive. It is not a mere co- 
incidence that the crusading spirit and idealism of the New Deal period 
began to drain out of the union movement as the economy began to shift 
over and adapt to the requirements of war. Now the ethics, the immoral- 
ity, and the cynicism spawned by the cold war have lowered the morale 
and also the power of the trade unions. 
The cold war is a burden on the back of labor. Unions will resume 
their rightful place of leadership in American life only as instruments of 
justice in a world of peace. 
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